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Words	For	A	Wired	World:	Cybersecurity	As	Communicative	Art	
	
ABSTRACT:		In	this	paper	I	propose	to	examine	the	Snowden	affair	as	a	cultural	and	communicative	phenomenon,	looking	at	the	ways	in	which	the	discussions	around	it	have	been	framed	and	presented	by	his	supporters,	his	detractors,	and	by	Snowden	himself.	Drawing	on	a	range	of	texts,	but	focusing	primarily	on	the	2014	graphic	novel	"Beyond	Edward	Snowden",	Snowden’s	2014	TED	talk	and	the	response	to	this	by	NSA	deputy	director	Richard	Ledgett,	I	will	seek	to	present	a	study	which,	drawing	on	Critical	Discourse	Analysis,	corpus	linguistics	and	Lakoff’s	theories	of	“frames”,	allows	us	to	better	understand	the	ways	in	which	this	event	has	been	“read”	by	the	various	sides.			The	Snowden	case	exemplifies	the	challenge	faced	by	those	working	within	cybersecurity	to	present	their	activities	(above	all	those	which	involve	the	monitoring	of	the	general	public	and	the	capture	of	data	concerning	them)	in	a	way	which	appears	reasonable	and	truthful,	and	which	is	expressed	in	a	way	which	matches	the	vision	of	the	world	held	by	the	intended	audience.	In	a	climate	of	ever-growing	distrust	of	officialdom	and	government	in	general,	there	is	a	desperate	need	to	find	a	more	effective	manner	of	stating	the	case	against	the	actions	of	individuals	such	as	Snowden,	Manning,	and	Assange	(to	say	nothing	of	the	activities	of	groups	such	as	Anonymous).	The	metaphor	of	cybersecurity	as	a	war	is	both	powerful	and	valid,	but	it	is	a	conflict	where	the	weapons	must	be	both	technical	and	verbal.	
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Words	For	A	Wired	World:	Cybersecurity	As	Communicative	Art		
1. Introduction:	Shaping	the	Terrain	
	
“Nothing	‘is’”	(Morrison	(1997):	12)		[Author’s	Note:	Throughout	this	paper,	I	will	be	referring	to	the	texts	examined	as	
examples	of	“discourse”;	what	this	term	means	depends	on	who	is	using	it,	and	why.	A	
Foucauldian	uses	it	to	mean	a	text	which	exemplifies	(often	implicit)	sociocultural	power	
relations,	while	a	linguist	engaged	in	discourse	analysis	(not	Critical	Discourse	Analysis)	
uses	it	to	mean	a	text	of	substantial	length,	under	analysis	to	examine	its	syntactic,	lexical	
and	semantic	features.	My	definition	of	the	term	is	perhaps	closest	to	that	given	by	the	
Critical	Discourse	Analyst	Norman	Fairclough	(2015):		“discourse	is	language	in	relation	
with	other	elements	in	the	social	process.”	(8).	In	other	words,	“discourse”	should	be	read	
here	as	synonymous	with	“a	text	inscribed	within,	spring	from,	and	embodying	a	particular	
set	of	social,	cultural	and	ideological	values”.]	
			In	a	2004	New	Yorker	article,	Malcolm	Gladwell	discusses	the	career	of	the	marketing	guru	Howard	Moskowitz,	who	was	asked	by	Pepsi	to	undertake	research	to	determine	the	“ideal”	level	of	sweetener	for	their	diet	cola.	Moskowitz	argued	that	the	secret	to	success	in	product	design	lay	in	the	construction	of	a	range	of	products,	rather	than	the	creation	of	a	single	“one	size	fits	all”	brand.	As	Gladwell	(2004)	puts	it,	““There	was	no	such	thing	as	the	perfect	Diet	Pepsi.	They	should	have	been	looking	for	the	perfect	Diet	Pepsis.”	What	Moskowitz	says	about	cola,	or	spaghetti	sauce,	or	coffee	is	equally	true	of	our	domain;	there	is	no	such	thing	as	perfect	cybersecurity	–	we	should	be	looking	for	the	perfect	cybersecurities.	The	idea	of	a	single	tactic	or	set	of	protocols	to	counter	the	range	of	threats	and	vulnerabilities	in	informational	space	is	ludicrous;	we	cannot	mitigate	against	insider	threat	or	social	engineering	in	the	same	way	that	we	defend	against	DDOS	attacks	or	ransomware.	Technical	issues	require	technical	solutions;	my	interest	lies	in	the	human	aspect	of	the	domain,	and	in	particular	in	this	paper	I	wish	to	examine	the	way	in	which	cybersecurity	exists	within	the	wider	realm	of	human	discourse,	an	informational	space	which	is	bounded	and	shaped	by	politics,	ideology	and	culture	as	much	as	by	technology.	For	cybersecurity	to	be	truly	effective,	it	must	adopt	a	blended	approach,	drawing	on	as	wide	a	range	of	disciplines	as	possible;	as	Wiener	(1988)	puts	it,	“There	is	no	Maginot	Line	of	the	Brain”	(122);	what	follows	is	an	attempt	to	address	certain	aspects	of	human	behavior	which	have	an	inevitable	influence	on	the	work	of	the	cybersecurity	professional,	both	directly	and	in	terms	of	shaping	the	environment	in	which	he	or	she	seeks	to	operate.		As	with	any	sphere	of	human	activity,	cybersecurity	exists	not	just	as	a	thing	in	itself,	a	clearly-defined	discipline	and	set	of	interests,	but	as	a	cultural	artefact,	open	to	opinion,	
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interpretation,	and	misinterpretation.	The	problems	this	raises	with	regard	to	any	consideration	of	“trust”	should	be	obvious;	for	something	to	be	trusted,	it	must	be	accepted	as	congruent	with	the	beliefs	of	the	individual	or	group	to	whom	it	is	presented,	and	this	is	never	a	matter	of	logic	alone.	The	idea	that	humans	make	decisions	on	coldly	rational	grounds	is	fatally	flawed,	as	Chatfield	(2009)	points	out:		 Over	the	past	two	decades,	economists	have	been	rediscovering	human	behaviour—real,	irrational,	confusing	human	behaviour,	that	is,	rather	than	the	predictable	actions	of	the	“economic	man”	who	used	to	be	pressed	into	service	whenever	modelling	was	to	be	done.			If	we	are	to	successfully	promote	tactics	and	policies	which	we	believe	will	lead	to	a	more	secure	cyberdomain,	then	it	must	be	done	in	a	way	which	matches	what	we	know	about	the	processes	which	successfully	influence	human	behaviour	at	both	an	individual	and	cultural	level.		Consider	the	following	diagram,	with	which	generations	of	linguists	are	all-too	familiar:		
	
Figure	1:	Saussure’s	model	of	a	human	speech	act	(Saussure	(1985):	27)		Saussure	presents	here	an	idealized	model	of	human	communication,	where	an	idea	passes	from	the	mind	of	speaker	A	to	the	mind	of	hearer	B	via	the	channel	of	speech;	this	in	turns	leads	to	a	response	transmitted	from	B	to	A.	The	connections	between	this	model	and	the	Shannon	Weaver	model	of	wireless	communication	are	obvious,	and	as	with	any	model,	it	serves	a	useful	purpose	in	reducing	the	act	to	its	essentials;	except	of	course	it	does	not.	As	a	model	of	human	communication	in	reality,	it	neglects	the	essential	fact	that	these	actions	do	not	take	place	in	a	neutral	zone,	uninfluenced	by	any	external	factors.	True	human	language,	in	short,	is	“noisy”.	More	than	that,	the	terrain	of	discourse	is	not	a	level	plane,	but	a	zone	contoured	by	hierarchies	and	power	relationships;	Saussure	places	both	speakers	on	the	same	level,	and	this	is	almost	never	the	case	in	any	real	human	communication.	If	we	are	to	generate	trust,	we	need	to	consider	what	Pratkanis	(2007)	terms	“landscaping”,	presenting	our	arguments	in	ways	which	enable	us	to	“occupy	the	moral	high	ground”	(the	metaphor	is	entirely	apt).	We	must	consider	not	just	the	content	of	our	communication,	but	its	form;	in	short,	we	need	to	be	aware	of	the	way	in	which	our	information	is	framed.		We	know	from	a	series	of	experimental	studies,	building	on	the	groundbreaking	work	of	Loftus	and	Palmer	(1974),	that	language	can	have	a	direct	effect	on	cognitive	processes	
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such	as	memory;	Hirschman,	Kahneman	et	al.	(1983)	discuss	the	ways	in	which	human	decision	making	is	invariably	conditioned	by	pre-existing	mental	heuristic	frameworks	and	the	way	in	which	the	choice	is	presented.	The	same	is	also	true	of	the	wider	domains	of	political	debate	and	persuasion	in	general.	We	view	the	world	through	a	series	of	filters,	which	are	formed	by	education,	family	and	peer	group	influences	and	wider	ideological	elements;	these	filters	construct	our	mental	map	of	creation,	the	frame	within	which	we	operate.	Much	work	on	political	communication	foregrounds	the	importance	for	those	who	wish	to	form	opinions	to	rely	on	this	concept	of	framing,	that	process	by	which:		 a	speaker’s	emphasis	on	a	subset	of	potentially	relevant	considerations	causes	individuals	to	focus	on	these	considerations	when	constructing	their	opinions	(Druckman	(2001):		1042)		All	human	thought	and	communication	is	framed;	a	means	of	exerting	effective	influence	(and	for	increasing	the	likelihood	that	messages	will	be	trusted)	is	to	ensure	that	we	deliberately	communicate	in	a	way	which	matches	our	audience’s	frame.	The	work	of	George	Lakoff	has	been	invaluable	in	showing	the	importance	of	an	understanding	of	the	concept	of	framing	as	a	sine	qua	non	for	successful	communication;	medium	and	message	must	work	together:		 Framing	is	about	getting	language	that	fits	your	worldview.	It	is	not	just	language.	The	ideas	are	primary	–	and	the	language	carries	those	ideas,	evokes	those	ideas.	(Lakoff	(2004):	Chapter	1.)		What	I	want	to	emphasize	above	all	in	this	paper	is	that	we	cannot	hope	to	gain	the	trust	of	users	if	we	do	not	present	what	we	do	in	a	way	which	makes	sense	to	them,	and	which	chimes	with	their	innate	conception	of	the	way	the	world	is/should	be.	Such	an	approach	requires	the	use	of	tools	and	approaches	drawn	from	linguistics,	as	a	means	of	determining	the	ways	in	which	communication	is	innately	linked	to	and	inscribed	within	extant	cultural	frames.	In	what	follows,	I	will	be	drawing	on	two	specific	methods	of	linguistic	enquiry.	Firstly,	critical	discourse	analysis	(CDA),	which,	as	Norman	Fairclough	(2015)	puts	it:		 combines	critique	of	discourse	and	explanation	of	how	it	figures	within	and	contributes	to	the	existing	social	reality,	as	a	basis	for	action	to	change	that	existing	reality	in	particular	aspects.	(6)		CDA	offers	a	way	of	examining	texts	as	a	means	of	revealing	their	underlying	sociocultural	and	ideological	drivers,	and	can	be	immensely	powerful.	However,	it	should	be	noted	that	(a	reflection	of	CDA’s	origin	in	the	radical	left-wing	scholarship	of	figures	such	as	Marcuse	and	Foucault)	Fairclough	presupposes	that	the	“existing	social	reality”	should	be	changed.	One	of	the	great	dangers	of	CDA	is	that	it	can	lead	to	analyses	which	are	a	priori,	parti	pris	and	partial,	in	both	senses	of	the	term	(incomplete	and	prejudiced).	To	be	truly	valuable,	and	to	defend	the	activity	against	accusations	of	unfounded	speculation,	CDA	must	be	grounded	in	empirical	data,	and	base	its	conclusions	on	a	bedrock	of	testable	evidence.		
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Such	evidence	can,	I	believe,	be	provided	by	recourse	to	the	second	of	the	analytical	approaches	I	will	be	employing	here,	namely	corpus	linguistics	(CL).	This	takes	a	text	or	texts,	which	form	the	corpus	to	be	investigated,	converts	them	to	a	machine	–readable	form	(in	this	case	UTF-8	encoded	.txt	files),	and	analyses	them	through	the	use	of	various	tools	in	order	to	reveal	significant	details	concerning	word	frequency,	collocation	and	to	create	concordances	of	keyword	appearance.	(The	software	used	in	this	paper	is	AntConc	(v.3.4.3),	a	freeware	program	devised	by	Laurence	Anthony).	What	might	be	termed	the	“CDA	community”	has	shown	a	certain	reluctance	to	embrace	CL	(Fairclough	(2015):	21),	but	I	believe	that	it	can	be	more	than	a	starting	point	for	enquiry,	rather	an	invaluable	and	inescapable	part	of	the	process	of	a	data-driven	CDA.	My	opinion	here	chimes	is	perfectly	expressed	by	Baker	et	al.	(2008):		 to	show	that	neither	CDA	nor	CL	need	be	subservient	to	the	other	[…]	but	that	each	contributes	equally	and	distinctly	to	a	methodological	synergy.	(274)		Having	now	outlined	this	paper’s	critical	stance,	and	the	methodological	approach	it	seeks	to	follow,	we	must	now	consider	the	material	I	wish	to	examine.	Given	that	a	central	element	of	my	argument	is	that	“cybersecurity”	must	engage	with	opinion	and	perception	as	much	as	with	fact,	I	will	be	looking	at	a	case	study	which	exemplifies	the	problems,	namely	the	case	of	Edward	Snowden.	I	am	not	concerned	with	what	he	did,	or	
how	he	did	it	(these	are	technical	matters,	and	lie	outside	my	area	of	expertise);	rather,	what	matters	here	is	what	we	might	term	the	“meaning”	of	his	actions,	and	the	way	in	which	they	have	been	presented	to	and	perceived	by	the	general	public.	This	is	a	difficult,	complex,	and	contentious	subject,	but	it	must	be	examined	if	we	are	to	truly	understand	how	cybersecurity	operates	within	society	and	culture.	The	problems	are	exemplified	by	the	cover	of	the	September	2014	issue	of	Wired;	aimed	at	an	audience	of	IT-savvy,	would-be	opinion-formers	and	digital	natives,	the	magazine	is	a	forum	in	which	the	cybersecurity	agenda	is	repeatedly	presented	and	examined	–	but	not	in	ways	that	the	cybersecurity	establishment	will	find	comfortable.	According	to	NSA	director	Keith	Alexander,	Snowden	has	done	irreparable	damage	to	the	security	of	the	United	States:		 "This	is	an	individual	who	is	not	acting,	in	my	opinion,	with	noble	intent	...	What	Snowden	has	revealed	has	caused	irreversible	and	significant	damage	to	our	country	and	to	our	allies."	(Ackerman	and	Rush	(2013)).		
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Figure	2:	Snowden	as	icon	(Wired)		That	is	most	definitely	not	how	Wired	depict	him;	consider	the	iconography	of	the	image.	A	young	man,	thin,	ascetic,	with	close-cut	but	carefully	coiffed	hair	and	unshaven	stubble,	stares	soulfully	into	the	middle	distance,	his	eyes	not	meeting	the	reader’s,	but	gazing	above	and	beyond.	The	presentation	is	not	that	of	a	traitor,	but	a	mystic,	or	a	saint	(and	martyr?);	the	religious	resonances	are	undeniable,	and	arguably	deliberate.	It	is	surely	no	accident	that	the	photo	has	been	lit	to	give	Snowden	a	halo.	To	further	counter	the	idea	of	Snowden	as	traitor,	he	is	depicted	holding,	not	burning	or	tearing,	the	American	flag;	I	would	ask	the	reader	to	consider	whether	it	is	being	held	as	a	lover	or	as	a	child	(I	veer	towards	the	latter).	Whichever	it	may	be,	he	is	undeniably	cradling	it	as	something	to	be	respected,	loved,	and	protected,	entirely	in	accordance	with	the	guidelines	of	the	US	Code,	Title	4,	§	8.	“Respect	for	Flag”:		 No	disrespect	should	be	shown	to	the	flag	of	the	United	States	of	America		and	§	8	(j):		 The	flag	represents	a	living	country	and	is	itself	considered	a	living	thing.			[my	emphasis]		It	must	be	noted	that	Wired	is	owned	by	the	Condé	Nast	publishing	empire,	which	produces	other	entirely	mainstream	magazines	as	Bon	Appétit,	Brides,	Golf	World,	and	
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The	New	Yorker;	it	does	not	spring	from	a	hotbed	of	political	radicalism,	and	relies	for	its	survival	on	capturing	the	largest	possible	readership.	When	a	magazine	like	Wired	presents	Snowden	in	this	way,	it	is	clear	to	see	that	those	in	our	community	who	seek	to	present	the	activities	of	the	government	and	state	security	services	as	trustworthy	have	an	uphill	task.	As	Paul	Newman	puts	it	in	Cool	Hand	Luke	(1967),	"What	we	got	here	is	a	failure	to	communicate."	Shortly	after	saying	this,	his	character	is	repeatedly	shot;	this	seems	to	me	a	powerful	symbolic	representation	of	the	risks	we	run	if	we	fail	to	find	a	way	to	engender	trust	in	what	we	do.	The	Snowden	affair	will,	I	believe,	be	seen	as	a	key	event	in	the	history	of	the	development	of	cyberspace	as	technical	environment,	human	habitat	and	political	battleground.	In	what	follows	I	want	to	examine	how	its	presentation	may	offer	possible	paths	for	study	as	ways	of	shaping	this	new	terrain.			
2.	Cybersecurity	as	Performance:	Analysing	Snowden	and	Ledgett		Since	its	initial	meeting	in	1984,	leading	to	the	establishment	of	annual	conferences	in	1990,	TED	(Technology,	Entertainment,	Design)	has	set	out	to	be	the	event	of	the	year	for	those	who	see	themselves	as	the	movers	and	shakers,	innovators	and	opinion	formers	of	the	modern	world.	In	their	own	words:		 TED	is	a	global	community,	welcoming	people	from	every	discipline	and	culture	who	seek	a	deeper	understanding	of	the	world.	We	believe	passionately	in	the	power	of	ideas	to	change	attitudes,	lives	and,	ultimately,	the	world.	(ted.com	(2015)).		This	self-selected	assembly	of	the	great	and	good	ensure	that	the	addresses	at	their	meetings	are	distributed	as	widely	as	possible,	via	their	website,	a	YouTube	channel	and	apps	for	both	IOS	and	Android.	The	list	of	TED	speakers	is	an	alphabet	of	all	the	talents,	from	Isabel	Allende	to	Ray	Zimbardo,	taking	in	on	the	way	a	catalogue	of	celebrity,	science	and	commerce:	Bono,	Bill	Gates,	Bill	Clinton,	Brian	Eno,	David	Cameron,	Jimmy	Wales,	Sergey	Brin…	and	so	on.	Our	interest	here	lies	in	two	talks	which	took	place	at	TED	2014,	on	March	17	and	19	respectively.	On	these	dates,	TED	pulled	off	a	duo	of	
coups	de	théâtre;	without	any	prior	warning,	they	staged	presentations	by	both	Edward	Snowden,	at	that	time	arguably	the	most-wanted	man	in	the	world,	and	the	Deputy	Director	of	the	NSA,	Richard	Ledgett.			From	the	perspective	of	a	CDA-based	study	of	these	addresses,	we	must	initially	move	away	from	a	consideration	of	their	content,	and	consider	the	general	environment	in	which	they	occur;	TED	is	not	a	court	of	law,	and	we	would	not	expect	the	speakers	to	be	subjected	to	a	forensic	level	of	questioning,	or	even	the	robust,	combative	of	style	of	interrogation	seen	in	news	broadcasting;	this	is	undoubtedly	the	case	here.	Both	Ledgett	and	Snowden	are	treated	with	respect	by	their	questioners,		and	to	those	of	us	accustomed	to	the	interviewing	style	of,	say,	Jeremy	Paxman,	they	seem	to	get	off	very	likely.	This	is	particularly	true	in	the	case	of	Snowden,	who	is	given	an	extremely	easy	ride.(One	of	the	areas	for	future	research	in	this	area	will	be	an	analysis	of	the	interview	Snowden	gave	to	NBC’s	Brian	Williams,	where	he	seems,	on	the	basis	of	an	initial	examination,	to	be	treated	equally	gently).	What	we	see	here	is	not	an	inquisition,	but	a	forum	where	both	sides	in	the	affair	can	state	their	case,	and	the	audience	(both	in	the	hall	and	in	the	wider	world)	are	left	free	to	draw	their	own	conclusions,	solely	on	the	
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evidence	of	the	speakers’	own	words;	at	least,	that	is	the	theory.	I	would	argue	that	what	we	actually	see	here	is	a	framing	(whether	deliberate	or	unconscious	is	open	to	question)	which	subtly	prejudices	the	viewer	towards	regarding	Snowden	as	the	injured	party.	As	I	have	said,	at	no	point	is	he	really	put	on	the	spot,	and	it	is	significant	that	one	of	his	questioners,	who	explicitly	states	his	positive	view	of	Snowden’s	actions	is	Tim	Berners-Lee.	When	the	creator	of	the	World	Wide	Web	places	himself	in	your	camp,	you	are	clearly	not	in	hostile	territory.		A	further	element	of	presentational	slant	can	be	seen	in	the	way	the	speakers	are	presented;	neither	Snowden	nor	Ledgett	is	actually	physically	present	at	the	venue	(the	reasons	for	this	are	not	difficult	to	determine	in	Snowden’s	case).	Both	appear	as	”talking	heads”,	projected	on	screen	so	the	audience	can	both	hear	and	see	them;	the	history	of	broadcasting	shows	us	how	important	image	can	be	in	the	transmission	of	ideas	in	the	battle	to	win	over	an	audience.	Consider	the	classic	case	of	the	Kennedy/Nixon	debate;	under	the	studio	lights,	Nixon	appeared	sweaty,	unshaven,	and	his	grey	suit	looked	bleached	out	and	insubstantial,	while	Kennedy,	who	wore	a	dark	suit	and	make	up,	appeared	composed,	assured	and	solid.	However,	those	who	heard	the	debate	on	radio,	and	were	not	distracted	by	the	images,	overwhelmingly	gave	the	day	to	Nixon.	What	we	see	at	TED	is	a	similar	process	of	presentational	framing:	Ledgett	appears	as	a	projected,	magnified	image,	as	does	Snowden,	but	the	presenters	also	allow	Snowden	another	mode	of	presence,	combining	the	virtual	and	the	actual.	When	introduced,	from	the	back	of	the	hall	emerges	a	mobile	monitor,	mounted	at	approximately	head	height,	on	which	is	projected	the	face	of	Snowden,	a	live	image	in	quasi-human	form.	The	telepresence	robot	moves	to	the	front	of	the	stage	and	begins	to	interact	with	the	convenor	and	the	audience	(the	robot	has	a	camera,	which	allows	Snowden	to	see	the	hall	in	real	time).	Snowden	effectively	appears	before	the	audience	”in	person”,	or	as	much	in	person	as	he	is	allowed	to;	he	is	embodied,	given	a	concrete	presence	on	a	human	scale	which	is	denied	Ledgett.	I	would	argue	that	this	deliberately	loads	the	bases	in	Snowden’s	favour,	not	least	because	it	heightens	the	sense	that	his	true	presence	in	the	flesh	is	denied	to	us;	his	appearance	in	robotic	form	simply	reinforces	the	idea	that	he	is	not	permitted	to	appear	free	and	unconstrained	to	state	his	case	in	person.	One	wonders	why	the	same	courtesy	was	not	extended	to	Ledgett.		The	presentational	form,	then,	can	be	seen	to	tip	the	scales	in	Snowden’s	favour;	turning	to	the	actual	content	of	what	the	two	men	say,	what	can	be	determined?	Firstly,	it	must	be	noted	that	what	we	are	witnessing	here	is	effectively	performance;	we	are	not	presented	with	a	neutral	dataset	which	we	are	free	to	interpret	as	we	might	wish.	Rather,	the	men	are	seeking	to	advance	their	own	opinion	as	the	”truth”,	and	as	such,	any	audience	must	take	into	account	the	centuries	of	work	on	poetry	and	rhetoric,	the	art	of	persuasion	and	influence	but	the	power	of	spoken	language.	Aristotle	defined	rhetoric	as	”the	faculty	of	observing	in	any	given	case	the	available	means	of	persuasion.”	(Rapp	(2002))	He	argued	that	it	rests	on	three	essential	elements:	ethos	(the	personal	qualities	of	the	speaker	or	the	person	or	body	promoted	or	attacked),	
pathos	(the	appeal	to	emotion)	and	logos	(the	use	of	reason,	and	factual	evidence).	What	we	see	here	are	two	examples	of	discourse	which	deploy	all	three	of	these	tactics.	Both	speakers	present	(or	claim	to	present)	factual	evidence	to	justify	their	point	of	view.	Ledgett	gives	figures	for	the	numbers	of	terrorist	attacks	prevented	by	NSA	surveillance,	whilst	Snowden	claims	that	”secret	judges	in	a	secret	court	based	on	secret	interpretation	of	law”	(Snowden	(2014a)	-	note	the	rhetorical	device	of	repetition	to	
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foreground	”secret”,	and	by	extension	unaccountability	-	have	approved	tens	of	thousands	of	government	warrants.	However	we	can	again	see	that	the	way	in	which	the	speakers	are	presented	to	the	audience	gives	Snowden’s	arguments	an	added	weighting	of	ethos	and	pathos;	he	is	framed	as	the	lone	crusader	for	justice,	an	exile	from	his	own	country,	claiming	that	all	his	actions	have	been	motivated	by	that	most	essential	of	American	values,	love	of	country,	and	a	simple	desire	to	do	what	is	right:		 If	I	had	to	describe	myself,	I	wouldn’t	use	words	like	”hero.”	I	wouldn’t	use	”Patriot,”	and	I	wouldn’t	use	”traitor.”	I’d	say	I’m	an	American	and	I’m	a	citizen,	just	like	everyone	else.	(Snowden	(2014a)		We	cannot	neglect	the	importance	of	ethos	and	pathos	as	persuasive	tools;	Snowden’s	words	tap	into	centuries	of	American	mythologizing	about	the	heroic	individual	battling	institutional	injustice	and	the	authoritarian	force	of	”big	government”.	His	self-deprecating	tone	is	straight	out	of	a	Frank	Capra	film;	Mr	Snowden	goes	to	Washington,	as	it	were.	Note	that	the	recent	documentary	on	the	Snowden	affair	is	titled	Citizenfour;	again	we	have	the	idea	presented	that	he	is	one	of	us,	and	an	”Us”	who	must	fight	against	an	implicit	“Them”.		This,	then,	is	the	general	context	within	which	the	two	texts	operate,	and	CDA	can	permit	us	to	take	it	much	further,	showing	how	Snowden	presents	himself	as	the	voice	of	American	individualism.	Conversely,	Ledgett	is	restrained	by	the	fact	that	he	speaks	for	the	establishment,	the	mouthpiece	of	the	”security	state”;	the	fact	that	Ledgett	speaks	not	as	an	individual,	but	on	behalf	of	the	organisation	for	which	he	works,	is	further	weakens	any	attempt	to	form	a	rapport	with	his	audience.	We	live	in	an	era	where	distrust	and	suspicion	of	government	and	the	organs	of	the	state	are	rife,	and	anyone	who	speaks	for	the	NSA	in	the	wake	of	the	disclosures	of	Snowden,	Manning	and	Assange	is	inevitably	going	to	be	seen	as	compromised.	Whether	this	is	fair	or	accurate	is	beside	the	point;	this	is	simply	how	it	is.	What	we	could	term	”the	plane	of	discourse”	within	which	discourses	about	cybersecurity	occur	has	been	shaped	(some	might	say	deformed)	by	these	disclosures,	and	any	attempt	to	ignore	this	or	discount	it	is	pointless.	In	trying	to	present	the	official	response	to	Snowden,	Ledgett	is	faced	with	the	near	impossible	task	of	persuading	his	audience	(and	the	wider	world)	that	the	official	line	is	the	right	one.	This	is,	I	would	argue,	a	big	ask.		What	is	presented	here	is	very	much	a	preliminary	study,	which	I	am	reluctant	to	dignify	even	with	the	description	”work	in	progress”;	it	represents	merely	an	attempt	to	sketch	out	an	initial	methodology	for	the	investigation	of	the	Snowden	affair,	and	to	be	truly	valid,	there	is	a	need	to	consider	a	much	broader	range	of	texts	where	Snowden’s	actions	are	discussed	and	debated	in	the	public	sphere.	In	many	ways,	this	is	a	preliminary	proof	of	concept,	the	attempt	to	see	whether	an	investigative	approach	based	on	the	combination	of	CDA	and	CL	can	obtain	significant	data	about	the	way	in	which	cybersecurity	can	and	should	be	presented.	A	CDA-based	approach	clearly	has	much	to	offer	in	terms	of	showing	how	the	way	in	which	our	arguments	are	advanced	is	an	essential	consideration.		What	can	a	closer	analysis	of	the	actual	language	used	by	Snowden	and	Ledgett	offer?		Given	that	these	two	speakers	represent	completely	opposite	positions,	the	first	thing	to	note	is	how	similar	to	the	language	they	use	actually	is.	An	analysis	of	lexical	frequency	
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reveals	a	close	degree	of	similarity	between	the	ways	in	which	they	coached	the	arguments,	as	table	1	shows.(I	have	merely	listed	the	first	50	words	used	by	both	in	order	of	frequency).			 	 Snowden		 Ledgett	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	
the	 	to	 	that	 	and	 	of	 	a	 	i	 	we	 	in	 	s	 	is	 	it	 	they	 	not	 	t	 	but	 	this	 	you	 	be	 	for	 	have	 	are	 	re	 	there	 	about	 	these	 	by	 	can	 	nsa	 	our	 	what	 	government	 	people		just	 	world	 	an	 	do	 	ve	 	with	 	been	 	going	 	has	 	internet	 	was	 	
the	 	that	 	and	 	of	 	to	 	in	 	a	 	s	 	is	 	we	 	i	 	are	 	so	 	have	 	it	 	there	 	you	 	those	 	think	 	our	 	for	 	people		they	 	re	 	who	 	one	 	on	 	not	 	actually	 	do	 	them	 	with	 	about	 	other	 	t	 	by	 	or	 	things	 	but	 	their	 	way	 	all	 	be	 	been	 	
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45	46	47	48	49	50		
need	 	think	 	when	 	all	 	as	 	because	 		 	
information	 	nsa	 	work	 	he	 	like	 	some	 			
Table	1:		Comparison	of	lexical	frequency	in	the	Ledgett	and	Snowden	TED	talks.		This,	however,	should	come	as	no	surprise;	CL	will	inevitably	reveal	that	in	normal	speech,	the	most	frequently	used	words	will	tend	overwhelmingly	to	be	articles	(“the”,”a”.	..),	determiners	(“the”,	“this”,	“those”…)	and	verbs(e.g.	forms	of	the	copular	such	as	“is”	and	“are”	and	common	verbs	such	as	“can”	and	“have”).	A	comparison	of	these	texts	with	a	list	of	lexical	frequency	derived	from	COCA	(the	Corpus	of	Contemporary	American	English,	available	for	consultation	at	http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/)	shows	just	“typical”	both	speakers’	language	use	is.	(see	Table	2	below).		 	 Snowden		 Ledgett	 COCA	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	
the	 	to	 	that	 	and	 	of	 	a	 	i	 	we	 	in	 	s	 	is	 	it	 	they	 	not	 	t	 	but	 	this	 	you	 	be	 	for	 	have	 	are	 	re	 	there	 	about	 	these	 	by	 	can	 	nsa	 	
the	 	that	 	and	 	of	 	to	 	in	 	a	 	s	 	is	 	we	 	i	 	are	 	so	 	have	 	it	 	there	 	you	 	those	 	think	 	our	 	for	 	people		they	 	re	 	who	 	one	 	on	 	not	 	actually	 	
			the				be				and				of				a				in				to				have				to				it				I				that				for				you				he				with				on				do				say				this				they				at				but				we				his				from				that				not				n't	
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30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50		
our	 	what	 	government	 	people		just	 	world	 	an	 	do	 	ve	 	with	 	been	 	going	 	has	 	internet	 	was	 	need	 	think	 	when	 	all	 	as	 	because	 		 	
do	 	them	 	with	 	about	 	other	 	t	 	by	 	or	 	things	 	but	 	their	 	way	 	all	 	be	 	been	 	information	 	nsa	 	work	 	he	 	like	 	some	 		
			by				she				or				as				what				go				their				can				who				get				if				would				her				all				my				make				about				know				will				as				up			
Table	2:		Comparison	of	lexical	frequency	in	the	Ledgett	and	Snowden	TED	talks	with	normal	frequency	in	US	English,	as	derived	from	COCA.		Such	data	is	helpful,	not	so	much	for	what	it	reveals	about	the	communicative	styles	of	Snowden	and	Ledgett,	but	for	those	who	wish	to	communicate	with	the	general	audience;	we	must	present	information	in	a	way	which	appears	conventional	and	familiar;	trust	is	engendered	by	communication	which	matches	the	expectations	of	an	audience.		Returning	to	the	examples	under	analysis,	a	simple	frequency	analysis	is	less	than	helpful	when	seeking	to	determine	the	specifics	of	their	communication.	Of	more	use	is	a	study	of	the	keywords	within	the	texts,	i.e.	those	words	which	are	used	more	frequently	than	is	the	norm.	Such	an	analysis	is	performed	by	mapping	a	text	against	a	corresponding	corpus	of	texts	which	matches	the	time	period	and	language	zone	where	the	texts	examined	originate.	As	I	do	not	currently	have	access	to	the	full	COCA	dataset,	I	have	used	here	MASC	(the	Manually	Annotated	Sub-Corpus,	available	at	http://www.anc.org/data/masc/),	a	freely	available	dataset	of	contemporary	American	English	written	and	spoken	data	derived	from	the	Open	American	National	Corpus	(OANC);	MASC,	dating	from	2006,	contains	a	balanced	set	of	50,	000	words	drawn	from	a	wide	range	of	spoken	and	written	sources,	and	provides	an	appropriate	bass	for	this	proof-of	-concept	study.		The	keyword	analysis	reveals	the	following	data	(listing	the	top	20	keywords	only);	put	crudely,	if	frequency	analysis	tells	us	what	people	are	talking	about,	keyword	analysis	analyses	to	get	a	data-driven	insight	into	what	really	matters	to	them.		
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	 Snowden	 Ledgett	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	
nsa	
internet	
that	government	
we	
intelligence	
communications	prism	they	
metadata	
privacy	these	world	programs	companies	re	bullrun	intercepted	secret	ve	
that	
nsa	so	those	actually	
privacy	
metadata	
intelligence	think	there	
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communications	are	capabilities	allies	inspector	transparent	have	
internet	snowden	
	
Table	3:	Keyword	comparison	of	Snowden	and	Ledgett	talks	(using	MASC	as	a	base	corpus	for	analysis)	–	common	terms	in	bold.		What	we	see	here,	as	before,	is	that	the	two	speakers	share	a	common	set	of	interests,	albeit	with	significant	differences.	To	cite	only	one	example;	Snowden	refers	to	PRISM	and	BULLRUN,	which	he	claimed	(on	the	basis	of	the	information	he	leaked	to	the	press)	to	be	programs	for	respectively	mass	surveillance	and	decryption	of	electronic	communications.	Ledgett,	makes	no	mention	of	BULLRUN	whatsoever,	and	mentions	PRISM	only	to	deny	that	it	was	used	against	the	US	population	in	general.	If	we	wish	to	understand	in	detail	the	differences	in	position	between	the	two	men,	we	must	turn	to	another	key	tool	of	CL,	and	consider	not	just	the	individual	keywords,	but	their	
collocations,	i.e.	the	words	which	appear	in	proximity	to	the	keywords.	An	oft-cited	dictum	of	CL	is	that	“you	can	tell	a	word	by	the	company	it	keeps”;	automated	collocation	analysis	allows	us	to	detect	these	ties	with	ease.			Purely	for	the	sake	of	example	(and	remembering	as	ever	that	this	is	a	proof-of-concept	study),	I	present	below	the	results	of	a	search	via	Ant	Conc	for	collocations	in	the	two	texts	with	the	keyword	“NSA”.	It	is	hardly	surprising	that	both	Snowden	and	Ledgett	attach	such	an	importance	to	the	word	(as	evidenced	by	the	high	degree	of	“keyness”	it	possesses	in	both	texts;	what	must	be	noted	is	that	a	study	of	the	phrase’s	collocations	allows	us	to	easily	see	that	the	two	speakers	adopt	very	different	stances	towards	the	national	Security	Agency.	If	we	examine	the	collocations	of	“NSA”	in	Ledgett’s	talk	(see	Table	4	below),	then	can	see	that	the	term	is	rarely	if	ever	used	in	a	negative	light,	and	when	it	is	(as	in	collocation	5	below,	it	is	not	arguing	for	moral	or	ethical	shortcomings,	but	to	suggest	that	it	has	simply	failed	to	display	openly	that	it	is	acting	ethically.				
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1	 So	what	if	somebody	who	works	in	the		 	 NSA	 --	and	there	are	over	35,000	people	who	do.		2	 Mr.	Snowden,	he	had	the	option	of	the		 		 NSA	 inspector	general,	the	Navy	inspector	general,	3	 that	he's	disclosed,	the	capabilities,	and	the		 	 NSA	 is	a	capabilities-based	organization,	so	when		4	 space.	But	I	will	tell	you	this.	So		 		 NSA	 has	two	missions.	One	is	the	Signals	Intellige	 	5	 our	processes,	our	oversight,	who	we	are.	We,		 NSA	 ,have	not	done	a	good	job	of	that,		6	 in	terms	of	numbers	of	terrorist	attacks	that		 		 NSA	 programs	contributed	to	stopping	was	54,	25	of	7	 beating	the	heck	out	of	us	over	the				 NSA	 programs,	by	the	way.	So	that's	not		8	 goes	on	in	the	executive	branch	and	within		 NSA	 itself	and	the	intelligence	community	about	wh	9	 judges	16	different	times,	and	so	this	is	not		 	 NSA	 running	off	and	doing	its	own	thing.	This		10	 every	two	years,	and	I	think	that	the		 	 NSA	 provided	all	the	relevant	information	to	our	o	11	 And	the	other	one	is	that	the		 	 NSA	 has	both	of	those	missions,	and	we	are		 	12	 out	of	my	lane.	That's	not	an		 		 NSA	 thing.	That	would	be	a	Department	of	Justice		13	 conversation,	and	it	impacts,	it's	not	just		 	 	 NSA	 ,	it's	not	just	the	government,	it's			
Table	4:	collocates	of	“NSA”	(Ledgett)		Table	5	below	shows	the	clear	difference	between	Ledgett’s	perception	of	the	NSA	and	Snowden’s.	As	the	collocations	show,	Snowden	presents	the	organization	as	illicitly	working	with	private	companies	to	monitor	online	communication	(1,	3),	when	not	actually	illegally	intercepting	traffic	(5,	7),	setting	in	place	mechanisms	to	extend	the	(illegal)	surveillance	of	American	citizens	(9-13,	15,	18-20),	and	so	on.	Similar	analyses	could	(and	in	due	course	must)	be	carried	out	on	other	keywords	such	as	“metadata”	and	“privacy”;	it	is	only	through	this	close,	data-driven	examination	of	the	discourse	that	we	can	really	hope	to	understand	how	the	debates	around	cybersecurity	(and/or	civil	liberties,	or	trust	in	monitoring	of	online	behaviour)	are	developing.		1	 America	to	do	its	dirty	work	for	the		 NSA	 .	And	even	though	some	of	these	companies	did		2	 and	open	Internet	should	be.	Right.	So	the			 	 NSA	 ‘s	own	slides	refer	to	it	as	direct		3	 direct	access.	What	that	means	to	an	actual		 	 	 NSA	 analyst,	someone	like	me	who	was	working	as		4	 representatives	sitting	in	a	smoky	room	with	the		 NSA	 palling	around	and	making	back-room	deals	abou	5	 reported	as	the	PRISM	story	that	said	the	 NSA	 broke	in	to	the	data	center	communications	bet	
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6	 a	compelled	but	hopefully	lawful	manner	with	the		 NSA	 ,	the	NSA	isn't	satisfied	with	that	7	 but	hopefully	lawful	manner	with	the	NSA,	the		 NSA	 isn't	satisfied	with	that,	and	because	of		8	 at	a	copy	of	"1984"	on	Amazon.com,	the		 		 	 NSA	 can	see	a	record	of	that,	the	Russian	9	 ,	I've	got	to	give	credit	to	the		 	 NSA	 for	using	appropriate	names	on	this.	This	is	10	 on	this.	This	is	one	of	my	favorite		 	 NSA	 cryptonyms.	Boundless	Informant	is	a	program	t	11	 tonyms.	Boundless	Informant	is	a	program	that	the		 	 NSA	 hid	from	Congress.	The	NSA	was	previously	aske	12	 program	that	the	NSA	hid	from	Congress.	The		 	 NSA	 was	previously	asked	by	Congress,	was	there	an	 	13	 already	exists.	It's	already	in	place.	The		 	 NSA	 has	its	own	internal	data	format	that	tracks	14	 for	someone	like	me	who	came	from	the		 NSA	 and	who's	seen	the	actual	internal	documents,	15	 ,	that	there	had	been	no	violations	of	the		 NSA	 NSA's	rules,	when	we	knew	this	story	was		 	 	16	 interesting	about	this,	about	the	fact	that	the		 NSA	 has	violated	their	own	rules,	their	own	laws	17	 And	she	then	requested	a	copy	from	the		 	 NSA	 NSA	and	received	it,	but	had	never	seen	this	18	 again	where	we've	got	to	thank	the		 	 NSA	 for	their	candor,	this	is	a	program	named		19	 nfrastructure.	They're	programs	through	which	the		 	 NSA	 intentionally	misleads	corporate	partners.	The	20	 're	building	in	backdoors	that	not	only	the		 NSA	 can	exploit,	but	anyone	else	who	has	time		21	 seen	in	the	post-9/11	era,	is	that	the		 	 NSA	 has	traditionally	worn	two	hats.	They've	been		22	 wise.	The	Bullrun	and	Edgehill-type	programs,	the	 NSA	 asked	for	these	authorities	back	in	the	1990s.	 	23	 you.	It's	a	little	bit	of	a	 NSA	 problem.				When	we	think	about	in	terms	of		 		
Table	5:	collocates	of	“NSA”	(Snowden)		This	section	of	my	paper	has	sought	to	show	that	CDA	and	CL	can	and	should	be	used	to	develop	as	full	and	accurate	a	picture	as	possible	of	a	text	under	examination;	this	is	of	course	a	transferrable	model,	which	can	in	theory	be	applied	to	any	area	of	discourse.	My	concern	in	applying	this	mode	of	study	to	these	texts,	in	this	intellectual	environment,	is	to	make	a	very	straightforward	point,	alluded	to	earlier.	Cybersecurity	marks	a	point	of	intersection	between	the	absolutes	and	clearly-defined	variables	of	the	scientific	realm	and	the	fuzzier,	irritatingly	inconsistent	domain	of	human	thoughts	and	belief.	As	study	of	the	Snowden	affair	all-too	ably	demonstrates,	trust	is	not	a	given,	and	
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public	opinion	can	be	swayed;	to	date,	we	see	little	real	sign	that	the	debate	sparked	by	Snowden’s	disclosures	is	about	to	conclude.	It	may,	in	fact,	only	just	be	beginning.		
3.	Beyond:	Edward	Snowden	–	Words,	Pictures	and	Image	warfare		 [we	shouldn’t]	allow	the	adversary	to	have	a	monopoly	of	pictures.	It’s	like	science	versus	religion.	What	do	we	believe	–	the	pictures	or	the	words?	(Jamie	Shea,	in	Mackay,	Tatham,	and	Rowland	(2011):	32)		For	the	modest	sum	of	$99,	you	can	now	purchase	an	action	figure	of	Edward	Snowden	from	www.thatsmyface.com,	with	a	range	of	outfits	and	accessories.	All	profits	go	to	the	Freedom	of	the	Press	Foundation	(https://freedom.press/).			
		
Figure	1:	Snowden	as	action	figure.	Source	URL:	http://www.thatsmyface.com/images/700x819xedward_snowden_figure_collage_ThatsMyFace_v4_sm.jpg.pagespeed.ic.IN9DDdeUTO.jpg		If	that	is	beyond	your	reach	you	can	imitate	the	artist	Ai	Weiwei,	and	recreate	him	in	Lego.		 	
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Figure	2:	Ai	Weiwiei’s	Lego	portrait	of	Snowden.	Source	URL:		https://naomijwilliams.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/imag0545.jpg		Or	construct	his	escape	into	exile	yourself:		
		
Figure	3:	Snowden	as	Lego	minifig.	Source	URL:		http://i.imgur.com/DNWQJTn.jpg		Or	simply	download	and	print	off	any	number	of	posters	or	images	which	mark	the	degree	to	which	he	has	become	an	icon	of	popular	culture:		
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Figure	4:	Snowden,	after	Fairey	(1).	Source	URL:		http://i.imgur.com/DNWQJTn.jpg	http://www.occupy.com/sites/default/files/edward-snowden-hero_v2.png		
		
Figure	5:	Snowden,	after	Fairey	(2).	Source	URL:	https://lawrentianslc.files.wordpress.com/2014/04/eddie-truth.jpg		(note	that	these	last	two	are	appropriations	of	the	style	and	format	of	Matthew	Fairey’s	pro-Obama	“HOPE”	poster)		
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Figure	6:	Snowden,	as	internet	meme.	Source	URL:	http://www.siliconrepublic.com/fs/img/tumblr_mo5urrJBOG1qz80pso1_500.jpg			
		
Figure	7:	Snowden	as	political	weapon.	Source	URL:	http://beforeitsnews.com/contributor/upload/5385/images/998396_252691128189263_625994824_n.jpg		
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Figure	8:	Snowden	meets	Twilight.	Source	URL:	https://img0.etsystatic.com/020/0/5414377/il_340x270.489606310_596f.jpg		(this	last	image	is	a	particularly	pleasing	conflation	of	internet	memes)		The	point	of	displaying	these	images	is	threefold;	firstly,	they	demonstrate	that	imagery	has	a	powerful	role	to	play	in	exerting	influence,	and	the	tools	to	construct	what	Roger	(2013)	terms	“image	munitions”	and	“counter-munitions”	are	freely	available.	Secondly,	and	crucially,	they	help	to	reinforce	the	concept	that	this	is	not	a	paper	about	Edward	Snowden,	but	“Edward	Snowden”,	a	symbol,	a	signifier	(in	Saussurean/Barthesian	terms),	or	the	incarnation	of	an	idea,	although	what	that	idea	may	be	depends	on	the	person	or	persons	making	use	of	this	image.	Finally,	they	act	as	a	bridge	between	the	verbal	texts	examined	in	the	previous	section	and	the	subject	under	consideration:	Edward	Snowden,	the	comic-book	hero.		2014	saw	the	publication	of	Beyond:	Edward	Snowden,	a	comic-book	retelling	of	the	events	in	the	affair,	which	presents	Snowden	as	a	fundamentally	enigmatic	figure,	who	becomes	embroiled	in	a	dark	world	of	state	surveillance	and	competing	political	interests.	Written	by	Valerie	d’Orazio	and	illustrated	by	Dan	Lauer,	the	text	is	narrated	by	an	imaginary	author,	“Virgil	T.	Hall”,	who	guides	us	through	the	labyrinthine	complexities	of	the	story;	the	name	“Virgil”	seems	to	be	a	clear	reference	to	Dante’s	
Inferno,	where	the	poet	is	led	through	Hell	by	the	Roman	poet.	D’Orazio	has	stated	directly	that	she	wanted	to	present	the	story	as	a	conspiracy	narrative,	something	which	has	clear	implications	for	issues	of	government,	cybersecurity,	and	trust:		 	One	of	my	big	influences	for	“Beyond”	was	the	old	“Big	Book	Of”	series	from	Paradox	Press/Vertigo	Comics.	Remember	those?	I	must	have	read	“The	Big	Book	Of	Conspiracies”	until	the	spine	collapsed.	Well,	I	love	speculating	about	current	events,	I	love	conspiracy	lore,	I	love	the	weird	and	unexplained—and	that’s	what	“Beyond”	is	all	about.	(D’Orazio	(2014))		Rather	than	presenting	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	way	in	which	Beyond:	Edward	Snowden	functions	as	an	example	of	the	multimodal	form	of	the	comic	strip,	what	I	want	to	
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emphasize	here	is	a	more	general	consideration	of	what	it	“means”	for	his	story	to	be	framed	within	this	specific	cultural	artefact.	There	is	nothing	inherently	“childish”	about	the	comic	strip	(such	a	belief	shows	a	confusion	of	form	and	content),	as	texts	such	as	Speigeman’s	Maus	or	Bechdel’s	Fun	Home	show.	However,	there	can	be	no	doubt	that,	in	Western	culture	at	least,	the	comic	strip	is	primarily	a	form	which	presents	tales	of	heroic,	godlike	individuals,	fundamentally	ethical	and	moral	narratives	which	dramatize	quintessential	values.	One	of	the	best	contemporary	comics	writers,	Grant	Morrison,	sums	this	up	perfectly:		 We	live	in	the	stories	we	tell	ourselves.	In	a	secular,	scientific	rational	culture	lacking	in	any	convincing	spiritual	leadership,	superhero	stories	speak	loudly	and	boldly	to	our	greatest	fears,	deepest	longings	and	highest	aspirations	[…]	the	best	superhero	stories	deal	directly	with	mythic	elements	of	human	experience	that	we	can	all	relate	to,	in	ways	that	are	imaginative,	profound,	funny,	and	provocative.	(Morrison	(2011):	xvii)		Now,	Beyond:	Edward	Snowden	is	not	a	mainstream	superhero	comic,	but	it	clearly	operates	within	a	cultural	climate	which	predisposes	us	to	see	the	protagonist	of	a	comic	as	a	“hero”;	add	to	this	the	way	in	which	the	work	deliberately	refers	to	works	of	popular	culture	which	present	the	individual	as	the	unwitting	victim	of	government	control	and	technology-led	repression	(The	X-Files,	The	Matrix,	V	For	Vendetta	are	all	referenced	verbally	and/or	visually	in	the	text),	and	we	can	see	a	definite	process	of	framing	at	work.	Snowden’s	actions	were	morally	motivated,	technologically	performed,	and	cause	a	political	problem;	what	we	see	here,	as	throughout	this	paper,	is	that	they	have	attained	a	cultural	significance,	which	has	repercussions	far	beyond	their	initial	significance.	Snowden,	in	short,	has	become	an	image	or	an	icon,	and	if	we	are	to	successfully	counter	the	prevailing	belief	that	“cybersecurity	=	oppression”,	we	desperately	need	to	develop	our	own	narrative	and	image-based	“counter-munitions”.		
4.	Conclusion		What	I	have	sought	to	do	here	is	to	apply	a	range	of	analytical	approaches	and	tools	to	show	that	the	Snowden	affair	has	a	cultural	impact	which	can	be	evaluated	through	a	study	of	the	ways	in	which	image	and	text	transmit	much	more	than	simply	factual	data;	this	has	immense	implications	for	those	who	wish	to	influence	the	current	conversation	about	cybersecurity.	We	live	in	a	world	where	popular	media	(from	Spooks	to	Person	of	
Interest)	present	visions	of	technology	as	a	tool	of	control,	and	where	the	means	of	instantaneous	dissemination	of	messages	on	a	global	scale	(and	software	which	allows	the	production	of	professional	quality	texts,	images	and	AV	material)	are	freely	available,	and	used,	often	by	groups	and	individuals	whose	beliefs	may	be	radically	opposed	to	our	own.	My	contention	is	that	if	we	wish	to	promote	trust	in	our	activities,	we	must	learn	from	the	communicative	approaches	employed	by	those	with	whom	we	most	disagree.	From	Anonymous	to	ISIS,	from	Adbusters	to	Occupy	(I	imply	no	moral	equivalence	between	these	groups),	we	can	see	the	highly	skilled	employment	of	effective	techniques	of	influence/persuasion/propaganda	(delete	as	applicable)	designed	to	operate	in	the	Information	Age.	If	we	are	to	succeed	in	engendering	trust,	we	undoubtedly	need	a	message	which	deserves	to	be	promoted,	but	it	must	be	presented	in	a	way	which	makes	sense	to	our	audience(s).	We	need	to	be	studying	texts	like	Boyd	and	Mitchell’s	Beautiful	Trouble	(2012)	and	Reinsborough	and	Canning’s	Re-
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Imagining	Change,	both	of	which	are	perfect	guides	to	the	techniques	used	by	popular	protest	movements.	We	must	examine	the	media	artefacts	produced	by	those	who	are	hostile	to	us,	not	simply	to	understand	them,	but	to	understand	how	they	promote	their	causes.	We	have	much	to	learn	from	them.	Recent	press	coverage	(Sengupta	(2015),	MacAskill	(2015],	and	Brown	(2015))	suggests	that	such	work	is	beginning	in	the	military	domain;	it	needs	to	occur	in	ours.		All	too	often,	cybersecurity	is	about	policy	and	practice;	if	we	are	ensure	that	what	we	do	is	trusted,	we	must	also	engage	with	people,	and	presentation.							
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